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Victorian Desalination Plant, Dalyston, Victoria, Australia

#00210

PartialRegion

Case study of

#00196 Large-scale desalination sized as drought insurance

Implementer

Victorian Government with AquaSure PPP consortium

Timeline

Since Jan 1, 2012

Location

Victorian Desalination Plant, Dalyston, Victoria, Australia-38.5872, 145.5257

Description

The Victorian Desalination Plant was procured at the height of the Millennium Drought via a PPP with AquaSure consortium. Capital cost blew out to ~A$4bn; on completion in 2012 it went straight into standby and delivered first water only in 2017. The contract structure obligates ~A$608M/yr in availability payments regardless of whether water is ordered, totalling ~A$18-19bn over 27 years. Since 2017, climate-driven inflow decline has driven near-annual orders of 100-125 GL/yr, reframing the plant as drought insurance — but at a contract price no replicator would choose. Sydney's plant followed the same arc: mothballed 2012-2019 at ~A$500k/day in standby charges before being restarted and now expanded.

Metrics

5
Capital cost~4billion AUD
Availability payment regardless of orders~608M/yr (~A$18-19bn over 27 years)AUD
Years between completion and first water deliveryCompleted 2012First water 2017years
Dry-year water orders since 2017100-125GL/yr
Sydney plant mothball cost 2012-2019~500,000/dayAUD

Funding

A$4,000,000,000 · Public-private partnership with fixed availability payments of ~A$608M/yr over 27 years

Lessons learned

  • Procuring during acute drought panic locked in a capital blowout and 27 years of fixed availability payments for a plant that sat idle for five years — separating the procurement decision from the drought-cycle timing is essential.
  • Rigid availability-payment PPP structures bill ratepayers continuously in wet years and become politically toxic when the insurance rationale was never communicated transparently at procurement; flexible take-or-pay triggers with variable payment tiers should be negotiated instead.
  • Sizing against long-run aridification trend proved correct — near-annual 100-125 GL/yr orders materialised once inflow decline became undeniable — but the contract structure negated much of the value: the lesson is to get both the sizing logic and the contract mechanism right simultaneously.

Documented Jul 24, 2026

Author AvatarArnaud Gissinger

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