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Cochabamba, Bolivia

#00192

PartialCity

Case study of

#00190 Run water as a public utility with a reinvestment mandate and a standing leak-reduction program

Implementer

SEMAPA (municipal utility) with citizen board seats; self-built water committees in Zona Sur

Timeline

Since Jan 1, 2000

Location

Cochabamba, Bolivia-17.3936, -66.1569

Description

Cochabamba is a critical cautionary case: in 2000 the 'water war' expelled the Bechtel-led concession after tariff hikes, and SEMAPA returned to public control with citizen seats on its board. Fifteen or more years later, non-revenue water remained at ~40–50%, managers were dismissed for corruption, and the Zona Sur (the poor southern districts that formed the water war's social base) remained largely unconnected to the network, dependent on private tankers at 5–10× network prices. Roughly 100–120 self-built neighborhood water committees in Zona Sur built and operated their own small systems but lacked treatment and sewerage capacity. The proposed public-community partnership between SEMAPA and the committees—linking utility-scale infrastructure to the committees' legitimacy—remains unimplemented.

Metrics

3
Non-revenue water at SEMAPA, 15+ years after remunicipalization~40-50%percent
Water price paid by tanker-dependent Zona Sur households vs. network price5-10x network pricesmultiple of network price
Self-built water committees in Zona Sur~100-120committees

Funding

Municipal utility revenues; community self-funding for Zona Sur water committees

Lessons learned

  • Defeating privatization is not building a utility: ownership change without reinvestment capacity and competent management reproduces the underlying failure.
  • Citizen board seats did not prevent clientelism or corruption at SEMAPA; governance design must reach management appointment and accountability, not just representation.
  • Community water committees can achieve real autonomy but hit hard ceilings (no treatment, no sewerage) without utility-scale technical and financial backing.
  • The poorest districts paid the highest price for institutional failure: 5–10× network prices for tanker water, 15+ years after the political victory fought in their name.

Documented Jul 24, 2026

Author AvatarArnaud Gissinger

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